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Using the Sarbanes-Oxley Act to Reward
Honest Corporations
By Tamar Frankel*

The Sarbanes-Oxley Act offers an opportunity to reward truthful corporationsand their
management, offering them a competitive advantage by relieving them from some of the
Act's provisions. Corporate culture plays an important role in a corporation'shonest behavior One size does not fit all in matters of organizationalintegrity. The provisions of the
Sarbanes-Oxley Act that apply the same internal controls and governance rules on all
public corporations impose unnecessary costs on honest corporationsby requiringthem to
change one set of good habits that are part of the corporate culture for anothermandated
by law. This essay suggests that relieffrom some of the internal control rules imposed by
the Sarbanes-Oxley Act might be an effective way to reward corporationsfor their honest
behavior rather than punishing them. The essay outlines a number of methods by which
this objective can be achieved.

INTRODUCTION
The U.S. Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 (the "Act" or "SOX")' offers an opportunity to reward truthful corporations and their management. Honest corporations should receive a competitive advantage by receiving relief from some of
the provisions of the Act so that those provisions are imposed only on rogue
2
corporations.
There are seven sections to this Essay Section one poses the question: What
makes an honest corporation? The general answer is that corporate culture plays
an important role in a corporation's honest behavior. The second section poses
the question: How can the law reward truthful corporations? The general answer
is either by threatening to punish wrongdoing, or by offering a competitive advantage to honest behavior. The third section suggests that an effective way for
* Michaels Faculty Research Scholar, Boston University School of Law, Boston, Massachusetts. I am
grateful to Professors Reinier Kraakman and Alan Ferrell, Harvard Law School, to Professor Alan Feld
of Boston University School of Law, and to the Boston University School of Law Faculty Workshop
for very helpful comments on this Essay
1. Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 7201-7266 (Supp. IV
2004) and in scattered sections of 11 U.S.C., 28 U.S.C., and 29 U.S.C. (Supp. 1II 2003 and Supp. IV
2004)) [hereinafter "SOX"I.
2. See infra text accompanying notes 143-57. Rogue corporations range from corporations found
guilty of fraud and other criminal offenses to corporations that settled regulators' investigations of
such offenses.
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the law to reward honest corporations is to provide those corporations with a
competitive advantage. Section four asks: When does it make sense to impose on
all corporations the same rules? When does "one size fits all" make sense and
when should rules be imposed on corporations selectively? The section offers
guidelines for applying prohibitory and constraining laws selectively, as opposed
to applying such laws generally The fifth section describes the Act generally
Section six outlines the Act's unusual features. It notes the criticisms those features
raise for imposing on all corporations the same internal controls and governance
rules. Section seven proposes relief from some of the internal control rules imposed by the Act. This section suggests that the Act could serve to reward corporations effectively for honest behavior by giving them a competitive advantage
over rogue corporations.
1.

WHAT MAKES AN HONEST CORPORATION? COMPETING ON
MERIT OR ON IMAGE?

Many American corporations are competitive, entrepreneurial, innovative, and
creative. When one examines some of the rogue corporations of the 1990s it is
easy to see that single-minded ambitions and drive directed their creative activities
down a slippery slope that led to illegal behavior. During the past thirty years,
and especially during the 1990s, too many businesses competed by finding gray
areas in the law, using aggressive accounting methods that led to hiding financial
3
weaknesses and painting deceptive images of greater financial success. Corporations that have pushed the envelope the most gained a competitive advantage
over others. It is not surprising that as long as preventive and enforcement measures were weak, the number of copycat competitors that followed those types of
behaviors rose,4 and inevitably brought about widespread fraud.
However, misleading images can prevail over reality only for a limited period
of time. Few corporations have lived up to their deceptive images and turned
their deceptions into reality Most did not. Their financial weaknesses could not
be hidden forever. They ultimately failed, and their deceptive images were then
discovered. A one-time deceptive action rarely leads to a full-fledged rogue corporation. Neither does a one-time correction of dishonest action produce an honest corporation. The main key to trustworthy corporations is their culture-their
organizational habits.5
3. See, e.g., TAMAR FRANKEL, TRUST AND HONESTY, AMERICA'S BUSINESS CULTURE AT A CROSSROAD
9-11 (2006).
4. "Market timing" by mutual funds advisers and representing contracts as property while hiding
corporate liabilities in financial statements are two examples of a myriad of loopholes that corporations
searched for, copied, and justified. See FRANKEL, supra note 3, at 25-48.
5. See FRANKEL, supra note 3, at 78-83, 191-92 (discussing corporate culture); id. at 195-98
(discussing the transformation of corporate culture); EDGAR H. SCHEIN, ORGANIZATIONAL CULTURE AND

12 (2d ed. 1992) (quoted in FRANKEL, supra note 3, at 196-97 (noting difficulty of changing
culture)). Examples of corporations whose cultures led to fraud are E.E Hutton and Enron. See JAMES
LEADERSHIP

STERNGOLD, BURNING DOWN THE HOUSE (1990) (discussing E.F
& JOHN FELONI, THE FALL OF THE HOUSE OF HUTTON (1989)

Hutton); DONNA SAMMONS CARPENTER
(discussing E.E Hutton); In re Enron

Corp. Sec., No. H-01-3624, 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7632, at *8-9 (S.D. Tex. Apr. 24, 2003) (discussing
Enron).
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Corporate culture is recognized in judicial findings. For example, one court
found in a corporation "anti-union conduct so pervasive as to have created a
corporate culture of lawlessness." 6 Culture was also emphasized in the case of
Enron Corporation. 7 Imposed secrecy was found to be a factor in another corporation's corporate culture, 8 wherein to avoid its contacts with Cuba, "Cuba was
referred to by 'code words.'"' 9 When Xerox Corporation could not "meet Wall
Street's earning expectations" it began to "engag[e] in massive accounting fraud."10
Xerox used various accounting methods to consistently bolster its "earnings, revenues and margins."1 Those changes were systemic at Xerox. They required the
knowledge and involvement of many employees. Again, top management knew
and supported, if not actually initiated, those accounting methods.' 2 "It is not
hard to visualize a slippery slope where accounting integrity is degraded in tiny
increments in the pursuit of earnings consistency In the case of Xerox, it is troubling that the company could become so financially distressed in such a short
period of time. We believe the specter of these allegations enhances the already
high risk profile of Xerox." 3 An anonymous note that alleged fraud was ignored

6. Dunkin' Donuts Mid-Atlantic Distrib. Ctr., Inc. v. NLRB, 363 E3d 437, 442 (D.C. Cir. 2004)
(noting an ALJ's finding that "'[wihile some employees may have voluntarily departed their jobs, those
who remain will doubtless share this history with newcomers."' The court noted that "the record also
showed that, in the words of the ALJ, there was 'a core of steady employees with whom the experience
of [the companies'] unlawful conduct will remain."' Consequently, "'an affirmative bargaining order
is necessary to remedy the ... unfair labor practices."').
7. In re Enron Corp. Sec., supra note 5, at *8-9 (discussing an earlier order by the court in which
the "[clourt found that Lead Plaintiff has stated a claim, including the pleading of facts raising a strong
inference of scienter, under § 10(b) ....
[Any executive sitting for a length of time on the Management
Committee, which was repeatedly asked to approve these deceptive devices and contrivances, would
have had to be aware of or have recklessly disregarded the warning signs .... Committee members
...approved a waiver of Faso's [and Michael Kipper's] conflicts of interest, contrary to Enron's own
Code of Conduct, and sanctioned the creation of most of the SPEs and partnerships and the illusory
transactions among them[,] ... all too frequently and blatantly created at critical SEC-reporting times
when Enron was in danger of not 'making its numbers' and [which were] artfully manipulated by
acknowledged, high-risk, aggressive accounting. The complaint paints a picture of these individuals
actively and knowingly participating in a corporate culture of brazen ambition toward the appearance
of ever increasing success, which was simultaneously being undermined by their blatant self-dealing
for personal enrichment. Their greed was rewarded by high salaries, extraordinary bonuses, and the
exercise of Enron stock options or sale of company stock, the value of all of which was continuously
inflated by their manipulation of Enron's financial reports. In other words, despite the repetitive
patterns of fraud constituting red flags, the Management Committee repeatedly rubber-stamped the
deceptive devices and contrivances and practices of SPEs['] abusive accounting used to move debt off
Enron's balance sheet and to claim sham revenue, while providing [Committee members] with lucrative returns from the alleged Ponzi scheme.").
8. United States v. Brodie, 403 E3d 123, 155-56 (3d Cir. 2005) ("The government evidence shows
a corporate culture pervaded by the use of code words for Cuba, and such naturally gives rise to an
inference of concealment .... 'The one aspect of the operation that they kept secret was the Cuban
connection.'") (quoting United States v. Macko, 994 F2d 1526, 1535 (11th Cir. 1993)).
9. Brodie, 403 E3d at 158.
10. Carlson v. Xerox Corp., 392 F Supp. 2d 267, 271 (D. Conn. 2005) (quoting allegations in the
Complaint).
11. Id. at 272.
12. See In re Barry D. Romeril, ACCA (Former), Rel. No. 34-48134, 2003 SEC LEXIS 1592, at *56 (July 7, 2003).
13. 392 F Supp. 2d at 276-77.
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by senior management. That response was interpreted "as a signal that Xerox had
'a culture that didn't recognize that it was not a good thing to be getting anonymous letters about fraud.' "14
Corporations are creatures of habit, like the people who populate them and
the society in which they operate. Culture is a social habit. It is a habit acquired
and practiced by a group, whether by a family, a corporation, or a country. Personal and group habits are efficient. They reduce the anxiety produced by the
need to choose and make decisions. Habits produce a sense of security, knowing
what behavior is expected under what conditions. Corporations are creatures of
habit because they are composed of individuals that interact in the same or similar
ways day to day This expected form and substance of interaction amounts to the
"culture" of the corporation. iS
Habitual corporate interactions are embedded not only in personal relationships but also in the processes and forms of interaction that have been put in
place and practiced for many years. When those processes become very rigid with
repetition and time, they acquire the force of entrenched habits. The organizational culture amounts to a behavior among group members that is assumed
6
without debate, consideration, and thought.'
Co-porate culture is built on organizational and interpersonal rules and procedures. Organizations are composed of groups of people that have different personalities, histories, and lives outside the organizations. 1 7 Nonetheless, groups
have personalities and habits of their own. Those habits depend not only on
particular individuals who populate the groups but also on the systemic processes
of interaction among group members and their expected behavior. Therefore,
removing the leaders of a criminal organization, for example, may not necessarily
affect the group's behavior. 8 Mafia families have annihilated each other on a
regular basis, but their culture and activities have fundamentally remained the
19
same.
14. Id. at 290 (quoting Complaint 317).
15. See supra note 5.
16. See supra note 5. That is why most settlement and probation orders for corporations found
guilty of fraud require revision of their internal processes. See, e.g., SEC v. Xerox Corp., No. 02 CV
2789 (DLC), Litigation Release No. 17465, 2002 SEC LEXIS 896 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 11, 2002). Caremark
International's salespeople violated referral rules by giving physicians great benefits as inducement for
selling corporate products. The structure of the corporation was highly decentralized. As part of its
settlement in an action by its stockholders, "Caremark agreed to establish a new compliance and ethics
committee of the board and a centralized system for regularly monitoring legal compliance at lower
levels of management." Jesse A. Finkelstein & Kevin G. Abrams, An Updated View of theDirectors'
Fiduciary Duty of Oversight In Delaware, INSIGHTS, Dec. 1996, at 17.
17. See, e.g., Pamela H. Bucy, Corporate Ethos: A Standardfor Imposing Corporate Criminal Liability,
75 MINN. L. REV. 1095, 1099 (1991) (proposing standard for corporate liability based on "assumption
that organizations possess an identity that is independent of specific individuals who control or work
for the organization"; the identity or "ethos" "results from the dynamic of many individuals working
together toward corporate goals").
18. See supra note 5.
19. See, e.g., Clarence Walker, A Special Investigative Report: American Mafia Recruits Sicilian Mafia,
AMERICANMAFIA.COM, Aug. 2004, available at http://www.americanmafia.com/FeatureArticles 272.
html (noting that "several prominent [Sicilian Mafia] members" were murdered in "gang wars" between
families in the 1980s and 1990s, but that the Sicilian Mafia remained active in criminal activities).
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Even though management may change, or an organization's members may go
to prison, the same processes and interactions that left the door open for criminal
activities can remain intact. Even if the members of the organization are told to
avoid the violations, the old processes, like old habits, can persist. The processes
and forms of which culture consists are not necessarily the ones that led to the
violations of the law, but they may be insufficient to withstand the pressures that
such as the drive to produce earnings (even if in
brought about the violations,
20
violation of the law).
Corporations that developed a culture for innovative deception have acquired
a habit of looking for further creativity of this type. It is not surprising that some
of these corporations continued to "cook the books" even after they were required
by regulators to restate their financial statements. That may be because their
internal procedures and the way they conducted business remained intact. The
21
Goodyear Corporation restated its financial statements three times in six months.
Goodyear may be an extreme example, but Huron Research has shown that a
number of corporations were "repeat violators." After they corrected their financial
statements they continued to publish incorrect financial statements. 22 Presumably,
their personnel simply continued to act as they were in the habit of acting. These
corporations maintained their culture.
Changing the Corporate Culture. Changing corporate culture and the processes that comprise it takes time and great effort. Organizations, like people,
protect themselves against changes in their habits. Even after convictions, there
are people in the organization who reject change by denying that problems ever
existed or that a wrongdoing was committed. The tendency to blame others or
involve others to share the blame is strong. 23 In corporations the opportunity for
blaming others or sharing the blame is greater than in the case of individual
criminals. Thus, changing the underlying assumptions on which people in corporations perceive others and on which people base their own actions is harder
when those assumptions are habitual and unquestioning. The more entrenched
the habits are, the greater the resistance to changing them. That is why cultural
habits are followed obstinately even after it becomes evident that the habits are
destroying the corporation. In sum, strong and persistent monitoring and new rules
to affect the culture of a criminal corporation are crucial to its rehabilitation.2"
20. See supra note 5.
21. Theo Francis & Timothy Aeppel, Tracking the Numbers: The Red Flag Called "Self Insurance,"
WALL ST. J., Mar. 15, 2004, at C3.
22. HURON CONSULTING GROUP, NEW REPORT BY HURON CONSULTING GROUP REVEALS FINANCIAL

RESTATEMENTS INCREASED AT RECORD LEVEL IN 2004 (Jan. 20, 2005), available at http://www.huron
consultinggroup.com/general0l.aspid =779&relatedProfessionalslD = 563&relatedSolutionslD = 333

&relatedResourcelD = 856.
23. See supra note 5; Robert Trigaux, They're Big, but Not Big Enough to Fess Up, ST. PETERSBURG
TIMES, Oct. 2, 2006, at ID (noting "the long line of CEOs, chairmen and other elites who have raised
their hands so solemnly before congressional committees and said 'not my fault' or claimed the bad
stuff always happened on somebody else's watch," including former Enron chief Ken Lay who "argued
he stayed above such details").

24. See supra note 5; Financial Collapse of Enron: Hearingof the Oversight and Investigations Subcommittee of the House Energy and Commerce Committee, 107th Cong. (2002) (testimony of Sherron Wat-
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Personal Habits and Group Habits: Objectives and Roles. One difference
between individuals and organizations may render enforcement of organizational
rehabilitation somewhat easier. That difference may facilitate enforcement by rewarding innocent corporations. The difference between individuals and corporations is that corporate objectives and the roles they play are usually more limited
than those of individuals.
Persons have far more objectives than corporations. Persons may aim at more
relaxation, more leisure, more money, more ego satisfaction, or a better spousal
relationship, or at maintaining what they have and avoiding competition. The
objectives of corporations are fewer. Corporate objectives are focused on financial
aims that include competitive advantage (or perhaps even the attainment of a legal
monopoly).
Persons play many roles: of spouses, parents, children, bosses and underlings,
athletes and musicians, to name a few. Corporations offer fewer personal roles.
People in corporations must know their places, their authority, and the roles that
they must play They may not change their roles except according to predetermined rules. In addition, corporate objectives are more clearly defined. Even if
corporations act altruistically, the underlying corporate goal is to advance their
businesses. To be sure, the desires and characteristics of the people who lead and
work in these organizations color the organizations. Nonetheless, within the organizations people are geared toward the organizations' goals and roles.
Changing corporate culture requires changing the procedures and the forms of
interaction among the actors within the organization. Identifying the actors and
the processes that relate to the objectives of a corporation may make it easier to
identify the rewards that might induce corporations to lead a more trustworthy
existence. 25 A competitive advantage is one of these objectives.
2. How CAN THE LAW REWARD HONEST CORPORATIONS?
THE GENERAL ANSWER IS: (1) By THREATENING TO
PUNISH ROGUE CORPORATIONS OR (2) By OFFERING
HONEST CORPORATIONS A COMPETITIVE ADVANTAGE
OVER ROGUE CORPORATIONS.
Generally, the purposes of punishment in the criminal law are to punish, deter,
and rehabilitate. 26 The focus of this Essay is somewhat different than a discussion
of punishment. It seeks to find incentives to encourage honest corporations to
continue to act honestly How can the law convince management that "honesty
pays"? The answer is to reduce the costs and liabilities to honest corporations and
management as compared to those who violate the law.
kins, Vice President, Enron) (statement of Rep. Greenwood that Watkins notified Enron CEO on
August 15, 2001, that corrective action should be taken, but until the Powers Report was released on
February 2, 2002, "no one at Enron or [Arthur] Andersen [its accounting firm] ever sought to address
these concerns").
25. See FRANKEL, supra note 3, at 190-92.
26. See 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(2) (2000 & Supp. IV 2004); Christopher A. Wray, Note, Corporate
Probation Under the New OrganizationalSentencing Guidelines, 101 YALE I.J. 2017, 2030-38 (1992).
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Changing the Corporate Culture as Part of Punishment. Yet, notwithstanding the differences between corporations and individuals, criminal law has been
applied to corporations. Corporations have been accused of crimes, and have been
punished by fines, and required to comply with other conditions to rehabilitate
their organizational criminal tendencies, as if they were individuals. Prison senthat
tences are reserved for the individuals within the corporate organizations
27
either committed the offenses or ordered them committed by others.
The status of a corporation under criminal law was, and still is, debated. A
corporation is a legal entity and not a person. How could it have intent and how
could it receive a prison sentence?28 The debate on the effect of corporate criminal
prosecution has continued as well. 29 After all, the effect of prosecution must reach
those who act on behalf of the corporation, and if direct personal punishment is
more effective than indirect corporate punishment, why not impose the more
direct and more effective punishment on corporate agents rather than on the
corporation? Besides, the fines that a corporation might be required to pay may
sometimes hurt innocent shareholders, although if the corporation gained, the
shareholders may have gained as well. Perhaps civil actions against corporations
would be more effective. 30 Corporate crime and punishment have also undergone
cost-benefit analyses, with various conclusions and suggestions. 31 Thus, the debate over the imposition of criminal law on corporations has not died.
The Purposes of Criminal Law That Apply to Corporations Are Essentially
the Same as the Purposes of Criminal Law That Apply to Individuals. One
purpose of criminal law as it applies to corporations is to rehabilitate-that is, to
change the future behavior of the criminal corporation and satisfy the societal
need for revenge and retribution. Another purpose is to make the wrongdoer pay
for its crimes-and, in the process, satisfy the need for revenge and signal that
wrongdoing gets its just deserts. Finally, punishment is designed to deter-that
is, to affect the future behavior of both potentially rogue corporations and others
that have not committed wrongs, or have not been caught committing wrongs.
Punishment signals the cost of illegal behavior and may deter those corporations

27. See, e.g., Business This Week, ECONOMIST (U.S. ed.), Sept. 24, 2005 (noting prison sentences
given to officials at Tyco International, WorldCom, and Adelphi Communications).
28. Jennifer Arlen & Reinier Kraakman, Controlling Corporate Misconduct: An Analysis of Corporate Liability Regimes, 72 N.Y.U. L. REV. 687, 688-91 (1997); Lance Cole, Corporate Criminal
Liability in the 21st Century: A New Era?, 45 S. TEX. L. REV. 147 (2003) (tracing the evolution of
corporate criminal liability; citing cases and other articles). For arguments for fines as optimal punishment, see Richard A. Posner, Optimal Sentences for White-Collar Criminals, 17 AM. CRiM. L. REv.
409, 417 (1980); Wray, supra note 26, at 2030-38. See generally Michael K. Block, Optimal Penalties,
Criminal Law and the Control of Corporate Behavior, 71 B.U. L. REV. 395 (1991); Daniel R. Fischel
& Alan 0. Sykes, Corporate Crime, 25 J. LEGAL STUD. 319 (1996); Steven Shavell, Criminal Law and
the Optimal Use of Nonmonetary Sanctions as a Deterrent, 85 COLUM. L. REV. 1232 (1985).
29. See, e.g., supra note 28.
30. Steven C. Bennett, Developments in the Movement Against Corporate Crime, 65 N.Y.U. L. REV. 871
(1990) (reviewing FRANCIS T. CULLEN, WILLIAM J. MAAKESTAD, & GRAY CAVENDER, CORPORATE CRIME
UNDER ATTACK: THE FORD PINTO CASE AND BEYOND (1987)) (responding to authors' approval of movement against corporate crime; suggesting alternatives to criminal proceedings against corporations).
31. Darryl K. Brown, Cost-Benefit Analysis in Criminal Law, 92 CAL. L. REV. 323 (2004).
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from such action. 32 As in the context of individuals, those objectives have a societal
aspect-to reduce the incidence of wrongdoing.
Corporations that have misbehaved are subject to a number of discretionary
punishments, in addition to the punishments mandated by criminal law. Corporations can bargain with prosecutors in the shadow of criminal law for suspended prosecution or settlement as well as receive suspended sentences and
probation. All these measures are tailor-made for wrongdoers. The following is a
short description of each of those measures.
Changing Corporate Culture Through Settlements in Exchange for Suspended Prosecution. Regulators and prosecutors have used suspended prosecution to deliver serious warnings to organizations that are suspected of wrongdoing, and to impose burdens on them. A growing number of companies have
settled potential charges of accounting fraud by agreeing to a form of corporate
probation, and have avoided criminal prosecution in exchange for good behavior
in the future. 33 The corporations agree to the settlement terms because the mere
charges can have serious consequences for their businesses. For example, criminal
charges can adversely affect their reputations in the United States and sometimes
abroad.

34

Prosecutors are interested in deferred prosecutions as well. With 300 open
fraud investigations, the Federal Bureau of Investigation began "using the deferred

32. WAYNE R. LAFAVE, CRIMINAL LAw (4th ed. 2003) (the purpose of criminal punishment is (1)
Prevention (also called particular deterrence)--§ 1.5(a)(1), at 26-27 ("to deter the criminal himself
...from committing further crimes"); (2) Restraint--§ 1.5(a)(2), at 27 (to protect society from persons
deemed dangerous by isolating them); (3) Rehabilitation--§ 1.5(a)(3), at 27-28 (to "rehabilitate" the
individual so he or she will not commit more crimes); (4) Deterrence (also called general deterrence)§ 1.5(a)(4), at 28-29 (to deter others); (5) Education--§ 1.5(a)(5), at 29 (to educate others, by the
attendant publicity, that a certain activity is not acceptable); (6) Retribution--§ 1.5(a)(6), at 29-31
("it is only fitting and just that one who has caused harm to others should himself suffer for it"); See
also the rationale for corporate liability against a corporation in 1 CHARLES E. TORCiA, WHARTON'S
CRIMINAL LAw § 49, at 319 (15th ed. 1993). Commentators disagree on which of these purposes are
applicable to corporations. See VS. Khanna, Corporate Criminal Liability: What Purpose Does It Serve?,
109 HARV. L. REV. 1477, 1494 (1996) (stating that author and other commentators and judges agree
that "deterrence, not retribution" is "the aim of... corporate criminal liability"). But see id. n.92 (citing
Developments in the Law-Corporate Crime: Regulating CorporateBehavior Through Criminal Sanctions,
92 HARV. L. REV. 1227, 1237-38 (1979)) (noting argument that retribution is a factor).
33. Stephen Taub, Deferring Prosecution of Corporate Crime, CFO.cOM, Jan. 5, 2005, available at
http://www.cfo.com/article.cfno3534777?f= related.
34. 15 U.S.C. § 80b-9 (2000 & Supp. IV 2004) (revoking the registration of an adviser subject to
criminal prosecution, and authorizing the U.S. Securities & Exchange Commission to exempt the
adviser from such a revocation). Corporations that have sought and received "deferred prosecution"
include Computer Associates International Inc., American International Group Inc., PNC Financial
Services Group Inc., and AmSouth Bancorp. Taub, supra note 33. "And 'we're going to see a lot more
of these,' said Robert Guffaw, an attorney with Sullivan and Cromwell who headed an internal probe
into accounting fraud at Computer Associates." Taub, supra note 33. "The most recent company to
agree to these arrangements is Time Warner." The company agreed in December 2004 "to pay $510
million to settle government probes into whether its America Online unit improperly booked advertising sales. Under the terms of the deferred prosecution, the U.S. Department of Justice will dismiss
charges if the company cooperates with prosecutors and doesn't engage in similar fraud for two years."
"[S]aid U.S. Deputy Attorney General James Comey, 'If AOL fails to comply with the agreement, the
deal is off, and they are in a world of trouble."' Id.
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prosecution option much more frequently '' 35 Suspended prosecution is desirable
when the prosecutors' budget is tight; when the case is not strong enough; when
the violations are not sufficiently serious; or when the violators could recruit
significant counter-pressures by political and business allies. Those settlements
may include requirements for internal restructuring of the organizations. However, the considerations for suspended prosecution are not applicable to every
case, and there are questions about the fairness of the bargains and doubts about
the long-term efficacy of the corporation's restructuring following a bargain be36
cause the corporation is not monitored and its violations are not enforced.
Changing Corporate Culture Through Settlements After the Start of Legal
Proceedings.37 Prosecutors are guided by a number of considerations regarding
settlements. The more important considerations are (1) the severity of the offense;
(2) the cost of conducting the prosecution; (3) the chances of successful prosecution; (4) the effect of a verdict on others who are in the same position as the
defendants; and (5) the defendants' cooperation in the investigation, including
38
whether the investigation leads to other wrongdoers and their prosecution.
Those considerations apply to individuals as well as to corporations. The considerations have greater weight when large corporations and thousands of documents
35. Taub, supra note 33 (quoting Timothy Coleman, senior counsel at the U.S. Department of
Justice, as stating, "We think it's a good tool for use in prosecuting large corporations with lots of
employees and lots of stakeholders.").
36. See, e.g., John E.Stoner, Corporate Criminal Liabilityfor Homicide: Can the Criminal Law Control
Corporate Behavior?, 38 Sw.L.J.
1275, 1288 (1985):
If a court mandates the internal restructuring of a corporation, some means for assuring that the
corporation follows the court's orders is necessary. The court in effect would have to become a
corporate watchdog, constantly monitoring those corporations acting under court orders. Overburdened courts cannot place themselves in such an untenable position.
37. The incentives for corporations to settle at some stage in criminal proceedings are greatly
affected by insurance. Insurance will not pay defendant corporations if they are found guilty Insurance
payments in such cases are against public policy To put more "bite" into settlements, the U.S. Securities
& Exchange Commission isconsidering making a condition to settlement that defendants do not
accept payments by insurance companies to cover defense costs and fines. The payments would
therefore have to come from the corporate coffers or the assets of the individual accused. Deborah
Solomon, SEC ConsidersSanctions, Boards Regulator Says Settlements May Have Stronger Terms in Future
CorporateActions, WALL ST. J., June 16, 2003, at A2.
Settlements and the agreed upon fines, however, do not mean the end of the claims against the
corporations. Settlements and fines may mean the beginning of claims by other regulators and by
injured investors. For example, Pimco Corporation paid $18 million before the SEC sued it. Siobhan
Hughes, SEC Nets Another Fund Settlement, WALL ST.J.,
Sept. 14, 2004, at C17. Then itsettled with
the SEC by paying $50 million. See In re PA Fund Mgmt. LLC, ReL. No. 34-50384, 83 SEC Docket
2287, 2004 SEC LEXIS 2085 (Sept. 15, 2004); see also Tami Luhby & Pradnya Joshi, Taking Stock
After Scandal: Mutual Funds Have New Safeguards After Investors Withdrew Billions from Tainted Firms,
NEWSDAY, Sept. 3, 2004, at E06 ("The following mutual fund companies have settled or agreed to
settle with state and federal regulators": Alliance Capital, $600 million; Bank of America (Nations
Funds), $675 million; Bank One, $90 million; Franklin Advisers, $50 million; Janus Capital, $226
million; MFS, $350 million; Pilgrim Baxter, $100 million; Pimco Equity Advisers, $18 million; Putnam,
$110 million; Strong Financial, $175 million. Total: $2.394 billion). Because most settlements allow
the accused to avoid admitting wrongdoing, the payments in full or in part are covered by insurance.
Id.
38. Larry D. Thomson, Principles of Federal Prosecution of Business Organizations (Jan. 20, 2003),
available at http://www.usdoj.gov/dag/cftf/corporate-guidelines.htm.
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are involved, and the cost of the prosecution is likely to be relatively high.
Importantly, many settlements include enforcement mechanisms, such as are used
in probation cases, discussed in the next section.
Changing Corporate Culture by Probation. Courts have had the authority to
place corporate defendants on probation-in addition to or as an alternative to
other punishments. 40 But probation has rarely been applied to corporations until
very recently 4' The U.S. Sentencing Commission has only recently paid more
attention to issues of corporate probation. Therefore, the punishment is relatively
new, but it is growing.42 As of the effective date of Chapter 8 of the U.S. Sentencing
the defendant orGuidelines in November 1991, courts were required to place
43
ganization on probation if any one of eight factors existed.
For corporate crimes, probation guidelines aim at three remedies: mandatory
restitution, community service, and rehabilitation through compliance programs.45
Yet, critics note that probation has proved disappointing, while others are concerned that some of the guidelines lead to "over-deterrence" and apply to cases
has been rewarded
of negligent but unintentional behavior. 46 Yet no corporation
47
for reorganizing and creating a more law-abiding culture.

39. See, e.g., Ben White & Peter Behr, Citigroup,J.P Morgan Settle over Enron Deals, WASH. POST,
July 29, 2003, at A01 (noting that prosecutor "stopped short of pursuing criminal charges ... because
it would have been difficult to prove that any individual acted with intent to commit fraud").
40. See Wray, supra note 26, at 2022-23; see also 18 U.S.C. § 3561 (2000) (current statute providing
for sentence of probation).
41. See Wray, supra note 26, at 2022-23; United States v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 465 E2d 58 (7th
Cir. 1972) (corporate defendant was convicted of violating statute prohibiting discharge of refuse into
navigable waters and was placed on probation. Defendant corporation appealed. The court of appeals
held that corporations are subject to statutory provisions authorizing courts to suspend imposition or
execution of sentences and corporations may be placed on probation. The court held, however, that
order requiring corporation to set up and complete program within 45 days to handle oil spillage into
soil and/or stream and authorizing appointment of special probation officer in event the conditions
were not met was unreasonable and in excess of court's authority The court reversed and remanded
the case for imposition of sentence.).
42. See Wray, supra note 26, at 2026-29 (noting that "[U.S. Sentencing] Commission began serious
discussion of organizational sentencing inJuly 1988 by circulating two proposals," one of which called
probation "frequently desirable").
43. See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 8D1.1 (2005), available at http://www.ussc.gov/
2005guidtabcon05_1 .htm.
44. 18 U.S.C.A. §§ 3551-3742 (West 2000 & Supp. 2006); 28 U.S.C.A. §§ 991-98 (West 2000 &
Supp. 2006).
45. Shayne Kennedy, Note, Probationand the Failure to Optimally Deter Corporate Misconduct, 71 S.
CAL. L. REV. 1075, 1093-94 (1998) (citing VS. Khanna, Corporate Criminal Liability: What Purpose
Does it Serve?, 109 HARv. L. REV. 1477, 1497 (1996), and listing the following costs associated with
reputational sanctions: (1) no one benefits from corporation's lost reputation, but someone is damaged
by a cash fine; (2) "the cost of a social stigma is hard to determine," but must "be calculated to establish
an optimal penalty"; (3) because of inaccurate evaluation of social stigma "reputational penalties will
result in over- and underdeterrence"; (4) "corporations can limit the effect of a social stigma by
generating positive publicity"; and (5) "only firms with a good reputation will be affected." Hence,
cash fines are more efficient); id. at 1103 (consequently, "[tlhe Guidelines need to be rewritten in a
manner that aligns the use of probation with the tenets of optimal penalty theory").
46. Mark A. Cohen, Criminal Law: Environmental Crime and Punishment: Legal/Economic Theory and
Empirical Evidence on Enforcement of Federal Environmental Statutes, 82 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY
1054 (1992).
47. Kendel Drew & Kyle A. Clark, Corporate Criminal Liability, 42 Am. CRIM. L. REV. 277, 300
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Increasingly, criminal punishments have included required mechanisms to
change corporate culture. Procedures for decision-making and compliance have
been put in place or revamped. Those punishments have become the focus especially in large corporations, and especially if the corporations' activities have
been spread around the globe. For those mechanisms to work, internal policing
must substitute for external policing, and culture is the backbone of enforcement
of any book of rules.

4

1

Revocation of Licenses and Registration. Many corporations cannot function
without licenses (e.g., broker dealers) 49 and registration (e.g., investment advisers).50 The revocation or suspension of a license or a registration indirectly imposes a fine, which includes lost profits. Needless to say, suspension may tarnish
the licensee's reputation for honesty However, that punishment does not necessarily require rehabilitation.

3. THE OTHER WAY: REWARDING HONEST CORPORATIONS BY
OFFERING THEM A COMPETITIVE ADVANTAGE

What remedy could provide a corporation with incentives to behave legally,
and impose a monitoring process or mechanism to ensure proper behavior?
Offering the Corporation a Competitive Advantage over Rogue Corporations. When a rogue corporation is punished, competitor corporations that have
not been found to have committed a wrong are rewarded. After all, competitor
corporations have not been punished while their competitor has been punished
and has likely paid fines, depleting its assets and tainting its reputation. Those
punishments offer benefits to the rogue corporation's honest competitors. Even
corporations that are slated for prosecution are at a competitive disadvantage and
pay significant fines to avoid prosecution. Others wait for prosecution and bear
the cost of probation and restructure or the suspension of their licenses temporarily or permanently. All the costs that are imposed on criminal corporations put
the honest corporations at a competitive advantage. This is as much as criminal
law can offer honest corporations.
Rewarding Leadership. Because corporate leadership greatly affects corporate
culture, rewarding leadership for honesty would logically be a good place to start
in rewarding honest corporations. The same is the case for rewarding corporate
employees for honesty Yet, rewarding for honesty is more complicated than rewarding for producing something tangible. It is, after all, a reward for not doing a
tempting wrong (taking more money than is due) or for doing something that is
less tempting but right (avoiding a misleading impression of success).
(2005) (at least "[iln 2002, no organization earned a reduction in its culpability score for having an
effective compliance program").
48. See FRANKEL, supra note 3, at 189-95.
49. See, e.g., 1 Louis Loss & JOEL SELIGMAN, SECURITIES REGULATION 86-93 (3d ed. 1998) (discussing state registration of broker-dealers).
50. See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. § 80b-3(a) (2000 & Supp. IV 2004) (generally requiring federal registration
of investment advisers).
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Besides, leadership culture has a strong influence on how much money and
benefits the corporate leaders receive. Thus, an additional monetary reward for
honesty might not be as valued, especially if a little dishonesty might produce far
more money Further, the law cannot easily reward leadership or employees without drawing the monetary rewards from either the country's treasury or the shareholders' pockets. If the shareholders wish to reward their leadership they can do
so on their own. It is doubtful whether taxpayers should pay for management's
honesty
There Are Good Reasons for Avoiding Monetary Rewards for Honesty. A
direct monetary reward for honesty is unseemly Honesty should be considered
the rule and not the exception. One does not reward people for not killing others,
just as one should not reward people for not stealing from others. A monetary
reward undermines the values of self-limitation and self-control in the face of
temptation. It is true that a person who returns valuables that he or she found
may be thanked by the owner in a tangible way, usually by a monetary payment.
But that is a voluntary act of the owner, and not an entitlement of the finder.
In addition, other motivations may affect corporate managers' behavior. When
managers demand higher pay in the millions, their motivation is usually not the
need for money but the desire for prestige and distinction.5 1 Money is the signal
and symbol of success and importance. Therefore, management's intangible reward for honesty could provide the same kind of satisfaction by means other than
direct monetary compensation.
Should Honest Corporations Be Rewarded with a Medal of Honesty? There
are differences between not punishing and awarding a medal of honesty as I
conceive it. In the first case, not punishing is a non-action rather than an action.
The receipt of a medal of honesty is more conspicuous. Further, there may be
more corporations that have not been punished than corporations that receive a
medal. A medal of honesty, however, is a symbolic gesture rather than a direct
contribution to the bottom line on the balance sheet of the corporation.
Rewarding the Corporation Rather Than Its Management. Honest corporate
management should not be rewarded by direct payment. For management and
other employees alike, an appropriate reward is prestige and highlighted distinction. Indirectly, however, profits of the corporation can provide strong incentives
to act honestly For example, corporate reputation for honesty is valuable in the
market and may lead to a more profitable corporation, and indirectly to increased
salaries for its management as well as for its employees.
Another way to reward an honest corporation is to bestow a competitive advantage, which directly rewards the business of the corporation. Such competitive
advantages indirectly benefit management and corporate employees with prestige
and self-worth, and with indirect monetary rewards that do not carry the disadvantages of direct money payments. Those benefits inure to the shareholders,
employees, and other stakeholders in the corporations, including management.
Further, giving honest corporations a competitive advantage over dishonest cor51. FRANKEL, supra note 3, at 92.
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porations can be achieved by law. In fact, every financial punishment of rogue
corporations gives honest corporations a competitive advantage by reputation and
avoidance of financial losses, provided the losses are not less than the profits from
the competitors' criminal activities. In sum, an optimal reward for an honest
corporation is indirect rather than a direct payment to management and employees. That reward comes in the form of a competitive advantage to the business of
the corporation.
4. WHEN DOES IT MAKE SENSE TO APPLY THE SAME RULES
TO ALL CORPORATIONS UNDER THE PRINCIPLE THAT
"ONE SIZE FITS ALL," AND WHEN SHOULD RULES BE
IMPOSED ON CORPORATIONS SELECTIVELY?

When costly internal regulations that are not necessary for honest corporations
are imposed on all corporations that are competitors, honest corporations do not
gain a competitive advantage over those who have violated the law. In some
situations these honest corporations could bear higher costs than do rogue corporations. Who then benefits from such rules?
Rules That Apply to All Corporations Offer Advantages. First, standardized
rules make it easier for the regulators to supervise the corporate subjects of the
regulation. Regulators include not only government regulators and examiners but
also the internal police within large organizations-that is, compliance officers,
comptrollers, and accountants. Second, generally applicable rules that relate to
accounting principles make it easier for investors to compare the financial statements of various corporations. This, as well as general accounting rules that apply
to all corporations, might strengthen public trust in the information that corporations offer the public. Third, general rules provide a level playing field for competitors. These reasons demonstrate the benefits of rules that apply uniformly to
all relatively similar actors. However, in certain contexts, general rules impose
high costs on honest corporations, as discussed below. In these circumstances the
rules may reduce, if not eliminate, the benefits of general rules that apply to all.
Disadvantages of Rules That Apply to All. By definition, regulations that
apply to all corporations are both over-inclusive and under-inclusive. Corporations may have particular and different problems that general regulations fail to
address, especially if the regulations apply to the internal processes of the corporations. Whether a regulation is effective depends on the nature of the corporation and its history as well as the regulation itself.
For example, Congress has imposed disclosure requirements on corporations
that issue securities to the public.5 2 The law mandates that the U.S. Securities and

52. See 15 U.S.C. § 77e (2000) (registration and prospectus requirements); 15 U.S.C. § 781 (2000
& Supp. IV 2004) (registration requirement); 15 U.S.C. § 78m(b)(1) (2000 & Supp. IV 2004) (reporting requirement).
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3
Exchange Commission ("SEC") provide the requirements for the disclosures.5 On
the one hand, the duty to disclose should be general. On the other hand, corporations have different histories and different degrees of transparency Some have
been public companies for decades. Others have only recently completed their
initial public offering. The SEC has been adjusting the disclosure forms to reduce,
if not eliminate, over- and under-inclusiveness as well as the costs of disclosure
to registered corporations.5 4 To be sure, this adjustment creates a competitive
advantage for large and well-known corporations as compared to small and lessknown corporations which must complete longer disclosure forms that are more
costly 5 5 On the other hand, certain small corporations are exempt from the disclosure obligations as long as they achieve their main objective of protecting
investors. 56 Thus, while the disclosure requirement generally applies to all corporations that offer their shares to the public, the detailed requirements are fashioned and tailored to accommodate particular types of corporations, thereby reducing both over- and under-inclusiveness.
Preventive rules usually include prohibitions, such as the prohibition on fiduciaries against engaging in conflict of interest transactions, 57 and requirements,
such as the requirements for prospectuses in a public offering 58 and for corporate
internal accounting. 59 When some corporations have violated the preventive regulations while others have not, it makes no sense to punish all by fines or restrictions. Prosecutions under criminal laws, settlements of suspended prosecution,
or sentencing by settlements or probation apply to those corporations that have
violated the law or were about to be prosecuted for alleged violations. The purpose
of preventive regulation is the same for all illegal actions. But the specific application of preventive regulation may differ depending on the particular circumstances of the accused corporation.

53. See 15 U.S.C. § 77g(a) (2000) (information in registration statement); 15 U.S.C. §§ 77j(b), (c)
(2000) (information in prospectus); 15 U.S.C. § 77s(a) (2000 & Supp. IV 2004) (general authority to
make rules and regulations regarding registration statements and prospectuses); 15 U.S.C. § 77j(d)
(2000) (authority to determine form of prospectus); 15 U.S.C. § 78l(b)(1) (2000 & Supp. IV 2004)
(referring to information SEC may require); 15 U.S.C. § 78m(b)(1) (2000 & Supp. IV 2004) (referring
to information SEC may require); 15 U.S.C. § 78m(b)(2) (2000 & Supp. IV 2004) (authority to
determine form of report).
54. See, e.g., Securities Offering Reform, Rel. No. 33-8591, 70 Fed. Reg. 44722 (Aug. 3, 2005)
(subsequently codified in scattered sections of 17 C.ER. (2006)).
55. See William K. Sjostrom, Jr., The Due Diligence Defense Under Section II of the Securities Act of
1933, 44 BRANDEs L.J. 549, 561 (2006) (comparing Securities Act registration forms and noting that
"Form S-1 is a full-blown registration statement" and that "Form S-3 is a short-form registration
statement." "To be eligible to use Form S-3 for a primary offering of securities, among other things, a
company must have a common stock public float of at least $75 million, have been a reporting
company for at least the previous year, and have filed all Exchange Act reports timely during the
previous year."). Compare Form S-1, 2 Fed. Sec. L. Rep. 7121 (Sept. 20, 2006) with Form S-3, 2
7151-7155 (Sept. 20, 2006).
Fed. Sec. L. Rep.
56. See 15 U.S.C. §§77c(b), (c), 77d(6), 781(g)(1) (2000 & Supp. IV 2004) (providing that registration requirement applies only to issuers of minimum size); 15 U.S.C. § 781(h) (2000 & Supp. IV
2004) (general exemption of issuers).
57. See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. § 78o-6 (Supp. IV 2004); 15 U.S.C. § 80a-17 (2000).
58. 15 U.S.C. § 77e(b) (2000) (prospectus requirement).
59. See 15 U.S.C. § 7262(b) (Supp. IV 2004) (requiring auditors to attest to, and report on, management's assessment of internal controls).
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Courts and regulators fashion punishments to fit the corporations that have
violated the law in light of their respective violations. They do so by settlements
before or after the beginning of criminal proceedings and by punishments, probation, and suspension of licenses after judgment. In addition, regulators are
sometimes authorized to fashion appropriate rules for particular actors as well as
for certain classes of actors by relieving them from the constraints of the law, or
60
by subjecting them to new and different constraints.
Preventive Measures Concerning Internal Governance. Internal corporate
governance has acquired increasing importance. That is because corporations
have become larger and have spread their influence and transactions all over the
world. The larger and less penetrable corporations become, the greater the need
for stricter legal requirements for strong corporate governance. Such corporations
must have effective internal private police because neither the markets nor the
government enforcement mechanisms can enforce the law on them. 6' Further,
strong private police will not be effective unless the culture of the corporationsthat is, the processes and rules by which the members of the corporations interact
as a matter of habit-are oriented toward honesty That is because
most people
62
will obey the law if they believe that others will do the same.
Thus, I believe that if corporations have installed internal policing programs
and have established a culture of honesty they are likely to operate honestly Any
rogue actor within such a corporation will be caught and punished. The detection
of such a person is just as important as the punishment to prevent the actions of
copycats within other corporations that may change the expectations of the copycats' corporate community and thereby the community's culture. Many corporations have applied and enforced such preventive mechanisms and have continued to operate honestly.

63

5. THE U.S. SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF

2002

When the 1990s Frauds Came to Light Congress and Regulators Reacted
by Imposing New Laws. The U.S. Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 (the "Act" or
60. See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. § 781(h) (2000 & Supp. IV 2004) (authorizing SEC to exempt "any issuer
or class of issuers").
61. See 17 C.ER. § 270.38a-1 (2006) (requiring investment companies to adopt compliance procedures and practices and designate a chief compliance officer); 17 C.ER. § 270.17j-1 (2006) (prohibiting certain personal investment activities of investment company personnel; requiring adoption
of code of ethics to prevent such activities).
62. See FRANKEL, supra note 3, at 189-95.
63. See, e.g., The WorldCom Case: Looking at Bankruptcy and Competition Issues: Testimony Before the
Sen. Comm. On the Judiciary, 108th Cong. (July 22, 2003) (statement of Nicholas Deb. Katzenbach,
Independent Director of MCI Board of Directors) (noting MCI's "efforts to instill the highest standards
of integrity" including a review of internal controls and a new code of ethics, and that its efforts and
their effectiveness were noticed in a court decision); see also Report Card: 50 Codes of Conduct Graded,
CORPEDIA (Nov. 15, 2006), available at http://welcome.corpedia.com/about/ (last visited Jan. 8, 2007)
(noting Ethisphere magazine and its mission to help executives and others "create a sustainable competitive advantage through better business practices and corporate citizenship"); Code of Conduct Services, CORPEDLA, available at http://welcome.corpedia.com/code-of-conduct-services/ (last visited Jan.
8, 2007) (noting services Corpedia performs to help organizations design, review, and update codes
of conduct); Center for Corporate Excellence, available at http://www.centerforcorporateexcellence.
com/ (mission is to "raise the standards of ethical conduct in business").
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"SOX") 64 imposes on all corporations the same internal controls and governance
rules. Congress substituted more specific rules for laws that were open to broader
and principle-based interpretations. That is because corporations and their lawyers had interpreted the old rules in ways that subverted the original purposes of
the rules. If an action was not specifically prohibited it was presumed to be permitted. Hence, specific prohibitions offered less maneuvering space for those who
sought to violate the spirit and purposes of the more general, principle-based
rules. In addition, the Act imposes strict duties not only on corporations but also
on their top management. No longer can management hide behind a veil of
ignorance.
The Act is sharply criticized and passionately supported. Studies on its costs
and benefits abound, 65 but their results remain inconclusive. On the fourth anniversary of its adoption, the Act is implemented while complaints remain stri67
dent. 66 There was also a voice of criticism at the light touch of the Act. The
following are the main criticisms of the Act and the responses to those criticisms.
The Act Has Increased the Costs of Compliance and Has Had a Negative
Effect on Small Companies. 68 From 2001 to 2003 the annual cost of being a
public firm for small public companies (those with annual revenues of less than
$1 billion) increased 130% to $2.86 million. For larger companies (those with
69
annual revenues of more than $1 billion) the cost increased to $7.4 million.
Those costs have affected revenues and, of course, corporate profits.7 0 In addition,

64. See supra note 1.
65. See, e.g., infra notes 67-74.
66. Andy Serwer, Stop Whining About SarbOx!, FORTUNE, Aug. 7, 2006, available at http://money
cnn.com/magazines/fortune/fortune archive/2006/08/07/8382589/index.htm.
67. Lawrence A. Cunningham, The Sarbanes-Oxley Yawn: Heavy Rhetoric, Light Reform (And It Just
Might Work), 35 CONN. L. REV. 915 (2003) (stating that the Act generally "is not major reform, but
patches and codifications and further study") (emphasis in original).
68. Executive Briefing, Sarbanes-Oxley Costs Affect Smaller Companies the Most, HRMAGAZINE, Aug. 1,
2006, available at http://www.allbusiness.com/sector-92-public-administration/administration-human/
1190687-1.html. On December 13, 2006, the SEC was expected to propose a rule to "allow auditing
firms to adopt 'principles-based' standards when reviewing their clients' intemal controls." This change
would "mean[I that small and midsize companies wouldn't necessarily have to spend millions to
overhaul their internal control systems to comply with ... Sarbanes-Oxley" Greg Farrell, Auditing
Change Could Ease Burden on Small Firms;SEC to Propose 'Principles-Based'Standardsfor Sarbanes-Oxley
Act, USA TODAY, Dec. 13, 2006, at 5B.
69. Michael Sisk, Reform's Heavy Load; Burdened by Sarbanes-Oxley, Small Companies Mull Staying
(or Going) Private, INV. DEALERS' DIG., Aug. 23, 2004. A total of 115 companies participated in the
survey. Id. Another study, cited by Andy Serwer, supra note 66, showed that compliance costs for the
Act's Section 404 alone are expected to average $4.36 million.
70. Katie Kuehner-Hebert, In Brief: Expenses Hurt Pacific Capital, AM. BANKER, July 28, 2006. According to the American Banker article:
The $7.2 billion-asset company said Thursday that its loans rose 22.8%, to $5.23 billion, and
deposits rose just 4.8%, to $4.84 billion. Pacific Capital resorted to higher-cost borrowings to
fund loan growth; its net interest margin fell 6 basis points, to 4.44%. Noninterest expenses
soared 41.6%, to $68.4 million, mainly because of the protracted' conversion of information
technology systems tied to acquisitions and higher-than-expected costs of complying with the
[Slection 404 internal-controls requirements of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act. One bright spot: Pretax
income for the 2006 tax season from refund anticipation loans and refund transfers jumped 36%,
to $87.7 million. Still, earnings per share of 25 cents missed the average of analysts' forecasts by
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the aggregate corporate costs of compliance were projected to be $5.5 billion in
2004,71 $6.1 billion in 2005,72 $8.4 billion in 2006, 73 and aggregate compliance

costs for SOX and other regulations, with the cost of technology,
could have risen
75
7
to $38 billion in 2006, and rise even higher in 2007.

Even privately held companies must comply with the Act if they position themselves to be acquired. 76 Because of the Act, small companies are less inclined to
go public. 77 They might reduce their hiring because
of the costs associated with
78
compliance that comes along with increased size.

In response, however, there are signals that the Act is creating jobs in servicing
the Act's requirements. 79 Perhaps "the private markets are better suited" to those

9 cents before the company issued a profit warning last month. Pacific Capital said it was launching a number of initiatives to improve performance. It is replacing its chief information technology
officer, reassessing operations that generate no revenue, and requiring its chief financial officer
to approve all large expenditures. It also plans to launch several promotions to boost deposits
and will open at least three branches by the end of next year.
71. John Berlau, Sarbanes-Oxley Is Business Disaster,Passage of the Sarbanes-Oxley CorporateReform
Act Was Supposed to Stop Corporate Abuses, but Instead It Has Strangled Small Business and Slowed Job
Growth, INSIGHT ON THE NEWS, Feb. 2, 2004, available at http://www.findarticles.comlp/articles/mim1571/is_ 2004 Feb 2/ai 112723160.
72. Kevin Reilly, AMR Research Estimates Sarbanes-Oxley Spending Will Exceed $6 Billion in 2006,
AMRResearch.com, Nov. 29, 2005, available at http://www.amrresearch.com/Content/View.asp?pmill
id= 18972. The article notes that while the 2006 number is similar to the 2005 assessment of $6.1
billion, internal head-count budgets were expected to drop eight percent to $2.3 billion in 2006;
technology allocation, however, was expected to rise 13 percent to $1.9 billion. Finally, external
consulting was expected to remain at about $1.8 billion in 2006. Id.
73. US Compliance Costs Pass $38 Billion, RISK MGMT. MAG. , Apr. 11, 2006, available at http://
www.riskmanagementmagazine.com.au/articles/0.0c03ec0c.asp (stating that "[clorporates [sic] in the
US will spend more than $38 billion on compliance this year, with 2007 expected to be even more
costly[,]" and that "[tlechnology is playing an increasing role in that, with $12.4 billion of the total
$38 billion spend [sic] on technology solutions").
74. US Compliance Costs Pass $38 Billion, RISK MGMT. MAG., supra note 73. In addition, North
American companies are expected to spend $27.3 billion in 2006 in compliance costs on "hardware,
software, and integration." Laurie Sullivan, Compliance Spending To Reach $28 Billion By 2007, TECHWEB
NEWS, Mar. 2, 2006, available at http://www.informationweek.com/management/compliance/181500
712 ("In June, Sarbanes-Oxley requirements kick in for foreign registrants, which are defined as
companies based outside the United States, but that trade stock or have debt within the U.S.").
75. US Compliance Costs Pass $38 Billion, RISK MGMT. MAG., supra note 73. In addition, North
American companies are expected to spend $28 billion in 2007 in compliance costs on "hardware,
software, and integration." Sullivan, supra note 74.
76. Sisk, supra note 69.
77. Id.
78. Berlau, supra note 71 (internal quotations omitted). The Berlau article states:
In Congress' passion to do something about Enron-like situations, once again small businesses
got financially hammered," says Jack Wynn, president of the National Small Public Company
Leadership Council. Citing the Small Business Administration, Wynn tells Insight that small
businesses create 73 percent of new jobs. "You're not going to have job growth without small
businesses," he says. "If small businesses are overburdened by regulation, it's no surprise they're
not creating jobs.
79. Id. Benefits are also beginning to flow through from compliance.
Surveyed firms listed the main business benefits being derived from compliance as streamlined
business processes, a more secure information environment and better quality. While SOX was
the biggest consumer of compliance spending, Securities and Exchange Commission compliance,

178

The Business Lawyer; Vol. 62, November 2006

small companies.80 Besides, as Senator Oxley commented, "If you're a small company, if you decide that you want to be a publicly traded company, that means
you're offering issues to the public, and the public investor needs to be assured
that you are going to achieve certain accounting standards and certain standards
of corporate governance. ""'
Publicly Held Companies Are "Going Private" to Escape the Act. The number of companies that have "gone private" "increased 63 percent in 2002 from
the previous year, even though 2001 was worse economically"8 2 The number of
foreign companies listed in United States securities markets is down in 2006.3
In response, however, these companies may have gone private for reasons other
than the cost and burdens of compliance with the Act. In addition, there are
foreign companies that find listing in the United States beneficial because the cost
of capital in their own countries is reduced, the American market is huge,8 4 and
"the extra transparency and higher governance standards demanded by American
85
law help [I their share prices."
The Act Reduces Investors' Wealth. One study concluded that the Act resulted in a "loss of $1.4 trillion of shareholder wealth; and that only some $400
billion could be explained by other factors ... a trillion-dollar negative impact
on the U.S. economy" 86
In response, another study concluded that "[o]n the day Sarbanes-Oxley was
signed, the market value of the Wilshire 5000 index-a proxy for all public companies in the U.S.-stood at $10.5 trillion. At the end of June, the Wilshire was
worth $16.14 trillion, an increase of 54%." s "To say that's all [due to the Act]
would be just as specious as some of the criticism of [the Act]. But to deny that
the restoration of confidence it brought had any impact would also be inaccurate.

customer compliance, records retention compliance and manufacturing traceability were the next
biggest compliance expenses....
US Compliance Costs Pass $38 Billion, RiSK MGMT. MAG., supra note 73.
80. Kate O'Sullivan, The Casefor Clarity: You Know About the Cost of Sarbox. What About the Benefits?,
CFO MAG., Sept. 1, 2006, available at http://www.cfo.com/article.cfm/7851741.
81. See Berlau, supra note 71.
82. Id.
83. See Stock Market Listings: In Search of Cheap Money, ECONOMIST, July 22, 2006, stating:
Big deals that would once have come to New York have gone elsewhere-notably the offerings
of shares in London this week by Rosneft, a Russian energy giant ...and in Hong Kong in June
by Bank of China, the country's third-largest bank. Coming up is another enormous offering,
from Industrial and Commercial Bank of China, which once would have already had a ticker
symbol reserved for it on the New York Stock Exchange but is now destined for Hong Kong and
London.
84. See Antisoma Investors Want Nasdaq Listing, INVESTORS CHRON., Aug. 25, 2006 ("Although many
US companies have listed -in the UK due to the costs associated with the Sarbanes-Oxley rules, [Antisoma's Chief Executive] says that 25 percent of Antisoma's investors are in the US and are urging
him to list there.").
85. Stock Market Listings: In Search of Cheap Money, ECONOMIST, supra note 83.
86. See O'Sullivan, supra note 80.
87. See Serwer, supra note 66.
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[The Act] isn't perfect. And by all means, it should be scrutinized. But consider
the alternative. What if we had done nothing?"88
Critics Question the Very Justification for the Act. Critics argue that investors know that a small public company usually carries more risk than a "bluechip" firm. The law's proponents "want a world of investment with no risk."89 For
these critics, regulation is to blame for the decline in market prices. 9°
Yet, these critics do not distinguish clearly between economic risk and risk of
fraud. The Act aims at the latter. The Act's mission is to ensure the integrity of
financial reporting and strengthen trust in corporations. Companies benefit from
being trustworthy If they "treat compliance as more than just a necessary budget
item [they] see unexpected benefits." 91 "How can a company say that [Section
404 of the Act] was a waste of money if three-quarters of board members had no
inkling that something wasn't quite right?"92 Trusted financial reports lower corporations' cost of capital. 93 In addition, institutional investors such as hedge funds
benefit from purchasing rogue companies subject to the Act whose stock prices
fall. Those hedge funds are buying the stock of such companies, which more risk94
averse investors are selling en masse.
'9 5
To be sure, "[it is extraordinarily difficult to quantify investor confidence."
But surveys show that the Act helped re-establish "faith in the marketplace. "96 A
recent academic study attempted to quantify investor confidence by examining
investors' reaction to companies' announcements of internal-control deficiencies.
The study found that "firms that announce control problems see a median increase
of one percent in their cost of capital compared with firms that make no such
announcements." 97 "Foreign issuers that list in the United States see as much as
a 30 percent higher valuation than companies that list only in their home markets.' '9 s The premium seems to reflect "all the monitors in the U.S. capital markets." 99 Some assert that they "still see companies coming to the United States to
list." (Nasdaq listed 22 international IPOs last year.) 00 Other countries, such as
Malaysia, see the value of the Act and are considering adopting similar legislation.' 0'

88. Id.
89. See Berlau, supra note 71.
90. Id.
91. See Sullivan, supra note 74.
92. See O'Sullivan, supra note 80.
93. Id.
94. Daniel Fisher, Sarboxed: Companies Tangled in Sarbanes-Oxley Problems Can Offer Profitsfor the
Patient Investor, FORBES, Aug. 14, 2006. The Act can create high profits for the patient and risk-taking
investors. Id.
95. See O'Sullivan, supra note 80.
96. Id.
97. Id.
98. Id.
99. Id.
100. Id.
101. yR. Srivatsan, Global Compliance Driving Smart Business to Get Smarter, NEw STRAITS TIMES
(Malaysia, June 1, 2006).
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While critics "worry that the regulatory burden ... outweighs the benefit of a
U.S. listing,"' 0 2 supporters worry that softening the Act's provisions would reduce
the valuation premium that New York Stock Exchange and NASDAQ listings
currently garner for foreign companies and such a softening may encourage critics
to push for even less regulation. 103 "If we dilute the standards, that value may
10 4

dissipate."

Is the Act Effective in Achieving its Purpose? Anecdotal evidence is to the
contrary Berkshire Hathaway "has a board that includes the wife and a son of
legendary CEO Warren Buffet. Yet shareholders don't seem to mind that much.
one firm that would have been able to comply almost perfectly
. .,,105
"[I]ronically,
.
with [the Act's] 'independence' requirements was Enron. Indeed, 86 percent of
its board was independent, and its audit committee was chaired by a former dean
of the Stanford Business School .... Yet when the scandals broke, the professor

claimed he didn't understand the complex audits of Enron and Arthur Andersen. "106 The Act "doesn't7 add anything. It's like a tax-just a direct deduction
0
from the bottom line."'
Not Everyone Agrees. The Act contributes to establishing a corporate culture
"where integrity is expected and rewarded at every level of the organization. Companies are beginning to see how good corporate citizenship contributes to the
bottom line. The means and the ends are coming into balance with one another
in their importance in decision making practices. That's a welcome reversal of
trend from the ends justifying the means as standard operating procedure in many
organizations. Companies are creating chief ethics officer positions not simply for
compliance purposes but also for creating programs that educate their workforce
0 8

about ethical practices and social responsibility"'1

There is also a suggestion that the initial shock of the Act and its seemingly
burdensome requirements have been turning into acceptance and a sense that
9
This conclusion is supported by case studies that
integrity is being restored. 10
predict: "Compliance with Sarbanes-Oxley will become a way of life." Some of
102. See O'Sullivan, supra note 80.
103. Id.
104. Id.
105. See Berlau, supra note 71.
106. Id.
107. See Serwer, supra note 66.
108. Nance Lucas & Tony Chambers, Editors' Commentary, J. LEADERSHIP & ORGANIZATIONAL
STUD., ASAP Center for Graduate Studies, June 22, 2004, available at http://www.accessmylibrary.com/
coms2/summary_0286-18355724_ITM.
109. Joe Gardyasz, Moving from Shock to Acceptance: Central Iowa Companies React to the Stricter
Requirements of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, Bus. REc. (Des Moines), Apr. 26, 2004, available at http://
www.businessrecord.com/main.asp?FromHome = l&TypelD = l&ArticlelD = 1048&SectionlD = I&
SubSectionlD = 1:
"Now I think the pendulum has swung from shock to acceptance," said Prust, who has 26 years
of audit experience with the firm. "Ithink there's still apprehension about how the outcomes
will be used, but now I think there's more a sense that there will be useful outcomes to this.
Overall, from the top I think this is sensed as being a good thing, in order to start the process
of repairing the integrity and everybody's confidence in the system, that now this is the benchmark that will be used."
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the requirements are going to be met by automation ....

In a survey of 119

corporations last year, Meta Group Inc. found that 34 percent were implementing
an IT project related to Sarbanes-Oxley."" 0
Nonetheless, the jury is still out on the costs and benefits of the Act. The answer
to whether the Act fulfills its purpose lies in the future. It takes time to change a
culture. Time will show whether the Act has been positive for the economy and
the market," 1I and whether the Act "is probably the best thing that's happened to
our business and one of the worst things that has happened to America." 112 "The
need for a repeatable, efficient compliance process is a matter of not only good
business practice but also hard-dollar necessity"" 3 While the costs of the Act "ate
up a significantly higher percentage of revenue than compliance activities done
before the act was in effect" the costs might be necessary to create "sustainable
compliance."' ' 4 It is compliance that involves people and "covers the spectrum
from top-management support down to line-level training and individual understanding of new responsibilities and routines."" 5 Changing a culture, like changing habits, requires time.
The Question Is: "How Much [Regulation] Is Too Much to Ensure the
Authenticity and Integrity of Financial-Statement Reporting?" 116 A conclusive
cost/benefit determination of the Act at this time may not be possible." 7 Just as
rogue corporations can gain (short-term) and undermine investors' trust (longterm), benefits to the integrity and reputation of the markets are hard to attribute
to particular corporations. Investors' trust in the market is difficult, if at all possible, to quantify. Many reasons can cause their trust and distrust. Besides, distrust
in the market could benefit the companies that remain honest and convince investors of their honesty
The Act Is Unique in One Special Respect. The Act "goes where the federal
government has never gone before in securities regulation, not just prohibiting
conduct but prescriptively mandating the duties of certain employees and board
members, designing the structure of boards of directors, and dictating one-size-fitsall processes for testing internal controls for nearly all public companies. It also is
displacing the traditional role of states in regulating corporate governance .... 18
The effects of the Act are not remarkable for honest corporations. "[I1f you're
a good firm and everybody knows you're a good firm, you don't appear to see as
110. Anne Chen, SarbOx Reaches Far and Wide: Case Studies Show that Compliance with SarbanesOxley Will Become a Way of Life, EWEEK, Feb. 23, 2004, available at http://www.eweek.com/article2/
0,1895,1542938,00.asp.
111. Serwer, supra note 66.
112. Id.
113. Michael P Voelker, The Road Ahead, NAT'L UNDERWRITER, Jan. 2006, at 16, available at http://
cms.nationalunderwnter.com/cms/td/Monthly%20lssues/Lssues/2006/01/ndex/Features/road%20ahead.
114. O'Sullivan, supra note 80.
115. Voelker, supra note 113.
116. O'Sullivan, supra note 80.
117. Sisk, supra note 69.
118. Berlau, supra note 71. This statement is accurate when applied to corporations generally,
although financial institutions such as mutual funds have long been regulated with respect to their
overnance. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 80a-2(a)(19), 80a-10(a), 80a-36 (2000 & Supp. IV 2004).
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much benefit to [the Act's Section] 404 .... .119 Corporations that received consistently "clean opinions may not see much cost-of-capital benefit [because] their
investors assume they have good controls. That assumption of financial integrity
is already priced into the stock. Compliance is like having insurance. You don't
get points for having proper insurance, but if you don't have it you get hammered . .2.0 2o These insights lead to the focus of this Essay
The Act generally applies to all corporations, whether they are found guilty of,
or are suspected of, violating the law. It applies to regulated and unregulated
institutions, to vendors, and to banks and insurance companies. The question is
whether all of the Act's provisions are appropriate for "one size fits all" application.
In order to answer this question, a summary of the Act is necessary. Then we can
distinguish between provisions that should apply to all corporations and those
that should apply only to corporations that have violated the law, or are strongly
suspected of having violated the law.
Governance Provisions. The Audit Committee. The Act intrudes into the
internal governance of publicly held corporations. It requires public corporations
to establish independent audit committees,' 2 1 responsible for "the appointment,
compensation, and oversight of the work" of the corporations' auditors. 2 2 The
audit committees must establish procedures for addressing complaints.1 23 The
committees should have authority to engage independent counsel and other advisers deemed necessary. 124 The corporations must provide appropriate funding
to the auditors and the audit committees' advisers. 25 The SEC is directed to
prescribe rules regarding management's assessment of the corporations' internal
controls.12 6
Auditors. Auditors are also subject to new requirements. The Act requires
auditors to attest to, and report on, management's assessment of internal controls, 2 7 and the SEC must propose and issue appropriate rules regarding improper
influence in the conduct of audits. 28
Principal Executive Officers. Under the Act, the SEC must require the principal executive officer(s) and principal financial officer(s) of the issuer to provide
an appropriate certification in each annual or quarterly report filed under Section
13(a) or 15(d) of the U.S. Securities & Exchange Act of 1934.129 The chief executive officer and chief financial officer forfeit to the issuer-corporation certain
bonuses and profits if the "issuer is required to prepare an accounting restatement

119. O'Sullivan, supra note 80 (quoting Ryan LaFond, assistant professor at MIT's Sloan School of
Management).
120. Id.
121. SOX, § 301, 116 Stat. at 775-77 (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 78j-1(m)(3) (Supp. IV 2004)).
122. Id. § 78j-1(m)(2).
123. Id. § 78j-l(m)(4).
124. Id. § 78j-l(m)(5).
125. Id. § 78j-l(m)(6).
126. SOX, § 404(a), 116 Stat. at 789 (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 7262(a) (Supp. IV 2004)).
127. Id. § 7262(b).
128. SOX, § 303, 116 Stat. at 778 (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 7242(d) (Supp. IV 2004)).
129. Id. § 302, 116 Stat. at 777-78 (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 7241 (Supp. IV 2004)).
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due to the material noncompliance of the issuer, as a result of misconduct, with
any financial reporting requirement under the securities laws." 130 Further, "it is
should
the sense of the Senate that the Federal income tax return of a1 corporation
3
be signed by the chief executive officer of such corporation." 1
The Act generally prohibits a director or an executive officer of an issuercorporation from certain trading during pension fund blackout periods, 32 and
prohibits issuers from making certain personal loans to any director or executive
involving
officer. 133 Further, the Act requires disclosures of specified transactions
34
directors, officers, and certain 10 percent beneficial owners.
Financial Reporting. The Act requires financial reports under the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934 to "reflect all material correcting adjustments that have
been identified by a registered public accounting firm.'1 35 In addition, the SEC
must issue rules that require issuers to (i) disclose off-balance sheet transactions
and disclose proforma information in an appropriate manner, 36 and (ii) disclose,
"together with periodic reports required pursuant to section 13(a) or 15(d) of the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934,... whether or not, and if not, the reason there-

fore, [the issuers have] adopted a code of ethics for senior financial officers, applicable to its principal financial officer and comptroller or principal accounting
137
officer, or persons performing similar functions."
The SEC must also revise the regulations on "matters requiring prompt disclosure on Form 8-K (or any successor thereto)." The Form requires an issuing
corporation to immediately disclose a "change in or waiver of the code of
ethics.' 1 38 In addition, the corporation should disclose, "with periodic reports"
under "sections 13(a) and 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 ...
whether or not, and if not, the reasons therefore, the audit committee of that
issuer is comprised of at least 1 member who is a financial expert, as such term
is defined by the [SEC]."' 39
Issuers must disclose "on a rapid and current basis such additional information
concerning material changes in the financial condition or operations of the issuer,
in plain English, which may include trend and qualitative information and graphic
presentations" as the SEC requires. 40
The SEC is required to adopt rules that address conflicts of interest by securities
analysts in preparing research reports, and the Act elaborates on what the rules
must include.' 41 In addition, SEC rules should require securities analysts, brokers,

130.
131.
132.
133.
134.
135.
136.
137.
138.
139.
140.
141.

Id. § 304(a), 116 Stat. at 778 (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 7243(a) (Supp. IV 2004)).
Id. § 1001, 116 Stat. at 807.
SOX, § 306, 116 Stat. at 779-80 (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 7244 (Supp. IV 2004)).
Id. § 402(a), 116 Stat. at 787-88 (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 78m(k) (Supp. IV 2004)).
Id. § 403, 116 Stat. at 788-89 (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 78p(a) (Supp. IV 2004)).
Id. § 401(a), 116 Stat. at 785-86 (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 78m(i) (Supp. IV 2004)).
Id. § 401, 116 Stat. at 785-87 (codified at 15 U.S.C. §§78m(j), 7261 (Supp. IV 2004)).
SOX, § 406(a), 116 Stat. at 789 (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 7264(a) (Supp. IV 2004)).
Id. § 406(b), 116 Stat. at 789-90 (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 7264(b) (Supp. IV 2004)).
Id. § 407, 116 Stat. at 790 (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 7265 (Supp. IV 2004)).
Id. § 409, 116 Stat. at 791 (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 78m(I) (Supp. IV 2004)).
SOX, § 501(a), 116 Stat. at 791-92 (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 78o-6(a) (Supp. IV 2004)).
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and dealers to disclose conflicts of interest, and the Act elaborates on what must
SEC to
be disclosed. 142 Attorneys are not left out of the Act. The Act requires the
14 3
set standards of professional conduct for attorneys representing issuers.
The Act imposes criminal penalties for the destruction, alteration, or falsification of records in federal investigations and bankruptcy,144 for the destruction of
criminal audit records,145 for defrauding shareholders of publicly traded companies,1 46 and for corruptly tampering with a record or otherwise impeding an official proceeding. 47 Criminal penalties are imposed on chief executive officers and
chief financial officers who knowingly or willfully sign false certifications of periodic financial reports. 48
Accounting Provisions. The Act establishes a new Public Accounting Oversight Board, and has set out its duties and the conditions for membership. 49
The Board is authorized to establish auditing, quality control, and independence standards and rules.' 50 It reports to the SEC annually' 5 ' Only a firm
registered with the Board may prepare an audit report for an issuer. There are
requirements to apply for registration and for members' periodic reports to the
Board. 152 In addition the Board must enforce the Act. It must conduct inspections as specified in the Act,' 53 and set procedures for investigations and disciplinary proceedings. 54 The SEC oversight of the Board under the Act includes
the authority to amend and approve the Board's rules. 55 In addition to the
creation of the Board, the Act sets criteria for the SEC's recognition of "generally
accepted" accounting standards, 56 proscribes accountants' conflicts of inter-

142. Id. § 501(b), 116 Stat. at 792-93 (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 78o-6(b) (Supp. IV2004)).
143. Id. §307, 116 Stat. at 784 (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 7245 (Supp. IV 2004)).
144. Id. §802(a), 116 Stat. at 800 (codified at 18 U.S.C. § 1519 (Supp. IV 2004)).
145. Id. §802(a), 116 Stat. at 800-01 (codified at 18 U.S.C. § 1520 (Supp. IV 2004)).
146. SOX, §807, 116 Stat. at 804 (codified at 18 U.S.C. § 1348 (Supp. IV 2004)).
147. Id. § 1102, 116 Stat. at 807 (codified at 18 U.S.C. § 1512(c) (Supp. IV 2004)).
148. Id. §906, 116 Stat. at 806 (codified at 18 U.S.C. § 1350 (Supp. IV 2004)).
149. Id.§ 101, 116 Stat. at 750-53 (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 7211 (Supp. IV2004)). The Act provides
that the Board must have five members, "prominent individuals of integrity and reputation who have
a demonstrated commitment to the interests of investors and the public," with an understanding of
issuer disclosures under the securities laws and accountant obligations related to audit reports regarding such disclosures. Id. § 101(e)(1), 116 Stat. at 751 (codified at 15 U.S.C. §7211(e)(1) (Supp.
IV 2004)). Two members (and only two) must be (or have been) state certified public accountants,
but if one isthe chairperson, he/she may not have been in practice in the five years before appointment.
Id. § 101(e)(2), 116 Stat. at 751 (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 7211(e)(2) (Supp. IV 2004)).
150. Id. § 103, 116 Stat. at 755-57 (codified at 15 U.S.C. §7213 (Supp. IV 2004)).
151. Id. § 101, 116 Stat. at 753 (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 7211(h) (Supp. IV 2004)).
152. SOX, § 102, 116 Stat. at 753-55 (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 7212 (Supp. IV2004)).
153. Id. § 104, 116 Stat. at 757-59 (codified at 15 U.S.C. §7214 (Supp. IV 2004)).
154. Id.§ 105, 116 Stat. at 759-64 (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 7215 (Supp. IV2004)). The Act clarifies
the status of foreign firms. Id. § 106, 116 Stat. at 764-65 (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 7216 (Supp. IV
2004)).
155. Id.§ 107, 116 Stat. at 765-68 (codified at 15 U.S.C. §7217 (Supp. IV 2004)).
156. Id. § 108, 116 Stat. at 768-69 (codified at 15 US.C. §§77s(b), 7218 (Supp. IV 2004)). See
also id. § 109, 116 Stat. at 769-71 (codified at 15 U.S.C. §§78m(b)(2)(C), 7219 (Supp. IV 2004))
(regarding the Board's funding).
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est,15 7 and prohibits improper influence on the conduct of audits in violation of
58
SEC rules. 1
6.

THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT'S UNUSUAL FEATURES
AND CRITICISMS

The Sarbanes-Oxley Act significantly intrudes on the internal governance of
publicly held corporations. The Act applies to all financial institutions, even those
that are specially regulated, such as banks and mutual funds, with limited exceptions. 159 The Act applies equally to rogue corporations and to corporations that
have not violated the law. The bad guys receive the medicine they deserve, and
the good guys, who do not deserve it, receive the Act's medicine as well. Honest
corporations do not benefit from their honest behavior because they are subject
to the Act's regulations as well. While accounting principles have traditionally
been generally applied, the structural internal governance rules have not. The Act
regulates internal accounting measures and structural internal governance. It imposes liabilities on top management for violations of the Act backed by criminal
sanctions. Thus, the Act raises the issue of whether "one size fits all" for internal
governance of different corporations is appropriate and the appropriateness of
management's liabilities and its costs arising from such uniform regulation.
Should the structural provisions of the Act apply to all corporations? Will the
uniform provisions in the Act make it easier for the SEC to supervise misbehavior
and make it easier for investors to compare corporations with more certainty?
The answers are uncertain. On the one hand, those provisions might strengthen
the public's trust in corporate America. On the other hand, the forced changes in
the internal structures of corporations that have not violated the law may be
counterproductive.
The internal governance provisions in the Act raised a chorus of objectors
against their general applicability1 60 Some objectors voiced strong complaints
about the costs of compliance and the authority of accountants to "invent" new
accounting systems that benefit only the accountants. 16' Honest corporations that
bear the costs of those new systems together with those who violate the law may
157. Id. § 201, 116 Stat. at 771-72 (codified at 15 U.S.C. §§ 78j-l(g)-(h), 7231 (Supp. IV 2004)).
78
See also id. § 202, 116 Stat. at 772-73 (codified at § j-l(i) (Supp. IV 2004)); id. § 203, 116 Stat. at
773 (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 78j-1(j )-(k) (Supp. IV 2004)); id. § 206, at 116 Stat. at 774-75 (codified
at 15 U.S.C. § 78j-1(l) (Supp. IV 2004)).
158. SOX, § 303(a), 116 Stat. at 778 (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 7242(a) (Supp. IV 2004)).
159. See id. § 2(a)(7), 116 Stat. at 747 (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 7201(a)(7) (Supp. IV 2004)):
The term "issuer" means an issuer (as defined in section 3 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934
(15 U.S.C. 78c)), the securities of which are registered under section 12 of that Act (15 U.S.C.
781), or that is required to file reports under section 15(d) (15 U.S.C. 78o(d)), or that files or
has filed a registration statement that has not yet become effective under the Securities Act of
1933 (15 U.S.C. 77a et seq.), and that it has not withdrawn.
160. See, e.g., Shaheen Pasha, Corporate Compliance Rules Challenged, CNNMoNEY.COM, Mar. 22,
2006 (claimants in a court case argue that the Act is unconstitutional), available at http://money
cnn.com/2006/03/2 1/news/companies/compliance-complaints!.
161. See, e.g., supra notes 68-75.
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well reconsider whether honesty pays. While critics understand that accounting
rules must apply to all, with few exceptions the rules that require internal restructuring and impose criminal risks on top management might not require "one size
fits all" rules. The Act has triggered corporate resistance. Whether rogue or honest,
corporations attempt to avoid the requirements of the Act by going private or
going abroad. 162 And competing jurisdictions abroad have advertised among their
63
benefits the fact that they are not subject to the Act.1
There are other critics, however, who believe that the Act is not sufficiently
strict.

64

They respond to the complaints about compliance costs by asking

whether corporate America has already forgotten Enron's lessons. These critics
argue for a level playing field among all corporations. Rules ought to apply equally
to all corporations that fall within the definition of public corporations.'65
Yet, rules may make distinctions between the persons or organizations to which
they apply Criminal laws apply to similar persons and corporations but distinguish among them by their actions. Similarly, Congress or the SEC can establish
rules that distinguish among corporations by the impact of the corporations' actions on others. A public offering of securities involves far more onerous rules
than a private placement of securities. We may argue about the rules, their specificity, and the lines we wish to draw between different corporations, but the idea
of applying different rules to different actors is not unique to the proposal that
corrupt organizations should be subject to stricter rules, and those who are not
corrupt should be relieved of those rules. The principle of equality under the law
applies only to similar actors, acting in precisely the same way, or in a similar
way, and having a similar impact on society and individuals. If the Act's provisions
are a penalty on honest corporations, then the Act should not maintain a level
playing field.
Honest corporations may achieve a culture of honesty in many different ways.
Honest corporate culture may depend on the personality of top management, on
the corporation's history, on its core business, or on many other factors that
contributed to its particular organizational structure and habits of interaction
among its actors. I think forcing corporations who have achieved a culture of
honesty to restructure has a number of effects. First, it destroys the honest culture-that is, the habits of interaction among individuals within the organiza162. Greg Farrell, Accounting Costs Rising as Wary Companies Play It Safe, USA ToDAY, July 31, 2003,
at B2 (noting "26% increase in the past year in companies going private"; suggesting that this may be
partly result of "increased costs of complying with the law"); Sen. Snowe Concerned Sarbanes-OxleyAct
Forces More U.S.-Based Initial
Public Offerings Overseas, US FED. NEWS, May 19, 2006 (citing studies
showing substantial decrease in U.S. IPOs and in 2005 "Europe raised 'more new money from IPOs
than the U.S. and Greater China combined''), available at http://sbc.senate.gov/HTML/news/US-Based
IPO-Overseas.html.
163. See, e.g., Sen. Snowe ConcernedSarbanes-OxleyAct Forces More U.S.-Based InitialPublic Offerings
Overseas, supra note 162 (noting that the Alternative Investment Market (AIM), the London Exchange's
market for small businesses, "is successfully persuading small U.S. companies to take their stocks
public in the United Kingdom").
164. See, e.g., Don A. Moore, SarbOx Doesn't Go Far Enough, Bus. WK., Apr. 17, 2006, available at
http://www.businessweek.com/magazine/content/06-16/b3980122.htm.
165. See, e.g., Cunningham, supra note 67.
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tion-by requiring them to replace its culture with another. Second, it imposes
on corporations the enormous costs associated with changing the culture. Third,
it creates a justified resentment that questions the value of and reward for honesty
and the validity and rationality of law. Thus, imposing the Act on corporations
that are not dishonest may undermine the culture of honesty that those corporations have maintained.
The Sarbanes-Oxley Act Can Be Used to Reward Honest Corporations by
Offering Them a Competitive Advantage. This Essay is based on the assumption
that competitive advantage is one of the strongest ways to motivate management's
actions. Just as competitive advantage might motivate management to violate or
allow violations of the law

66

it might also motivate management to strictly adhere

to the law. To be sure, fines and imprisonment can deter. But those need not be
the only ways in which deterrence can be achieved.
The Act offers a unique opportunity to provide a competitive advantage to
corporations that do not violate the law. Relief from a requirement to change
corporate culture and savings from the costs that such a change entails offer
significant competitive advantages to honest corporations. Thus, not only is relief
from the Act justified for honest corporations, but relief also provides a social benefit
by offering corporations an incentive to maintain honest corporate cultures.
Rules of Behavior Are General. Punishments for the Wrongdoers Are Particular. Corporations and individuals that are prosecuted for violations of the law
are subject to punishment. Some punishments are negotiated with prosecutors.
Some punishments are imposed by the courts as is, for example, probation. Some
punishments and relief from punishments are determined by special committees
such as parole committees.
There Are Special Rules for Law-Abiding Actors. The SEC may establish
rules for particular corporations that apply for exemptions. 6 7 Those exemptions
change the laws for the applicants and impose on them specialized restrictions
that differ from those applicable to everyone else. Therefore, we already have rules
that apply to a particular class of persons so that the rules differ for some specified
members of the class and not for others. In fact, settlements with prosecutors do
not achieve the same results. The prosecutors have discretion to agree to different
settlement terms with different corporations that are accused of the same wrongs. 16
Further, repeat violators may bear different punishments under the law than a

166. This type of violation is usually kept secret not only to hide it from the authorities but also
to hide it from competitors. But as the competitors find out about the violations, their management
feels constrained to do the same. In such situations people justify following this route by thinking,
"What can I do? Everyone does it. If Ido not, I will go bankrupt." Besides, "someone else is to blame
for my misbehavior, and finally, this is not misbehavior. So many corporations do the same. It cannot
be wrong." FRANKEL, supra note 3, at 25-48.
167. E.g., 15 U.S.C. § 80a-6(c) (2000).
168. See Press Release, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm'n, Statement of the Securities and Exchange
Commission Concerning Financial Penalties (Jan. 4,2006), availableat http://www.sec.gov/news/press/
2006-4.htm (stating guidelines for imposition of financial penalties; noting that penalty was imposed
in one recently settled action and not another).
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first-time offender, 1 69 and some discretion is vested in the courts as well as in the
17
prosecutors to decide the extent of punishment for criminal offenders. 0
The principle that, under certain circumstances, a law may apply to some corporations but not to others of the same class is part and parcel of our legal system.
There is nothing new or innovative about this principle except in one respect.
Different applications of rules to corporations or to individuals who fall into the
same class usually relate to the punishment of those who violate the rules. Within
the class of corporations to whom a rule applies all must be treated equally until
certain corporations are shown to have violated the rule. It is then and only then
that the corporations receive different treatments.
In fact, punishments are far more unequal than the standards that define violations. Violators are treated differently, not only from those who did not violate
the rules but also from each other. It may well be that the uncertainty about the
punishment for violating a law is another deterrent to obey the law.171 In addition,
there is a justification for the differences. After all, the circumstances of each
violating corporation may differ. For example, the chances of a corporation repeating its wrongs, as measured by changes in the corporation's leadership, structure, and personnel, may be different, and therefore the corporations' punishments may differ. Even after a violation occurs, it seems that there is precedent
for fitting the punishment to the violator and the circumstances of the violation.
The custom-made differences that apply to future behavior regarding internal
corporate controls are also triggered within the realm of punishment, such as
probation and parole. There is little precedent for a general rule that applies
automatically to all violators after a wrong is committed, except in very trivial
cases such as parking tickets. Thus, it seems that an automatic and clear application of a rule after a violation limits rather than expands the discretion of government prosecutors. Arguably, such a rule also reduces the deterrent effect of
punishment, especially if it is applied in a specific amount like a fine. In such a
case potential violations triggered by a cost-benefit analysis may be even more
inviting than they are today
The Act contains rules, which can be viewed as punishments. It restricts the
behavior and structure of organizations and imposes duties backed by criminal
sanctions on corporate management. It does not leave corporations free to behave
as they did before the adoption of the Act. Its rules do not have the salutary effect

169. See In re Thornton, No. 3-9046, 1997 SEC LEXIS 661, at *18 (Mar. 25, 1997) (stating in an
administrative proceeding that "repeated violations are a factor that weigh in favor of significant
sanctions"); U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 8C2.5 (2005), available at http://www.ussc.gov/
2005guid/tabcon05_l.htm (determining effect of prior history on culpability score).
170. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 8C2.8 (2005), available at http://www.ussc.gov/
2005guid/tabconO5_1.htm (stating factors for court to consider when determining corporate fine
within guideline range).
171. See Steven Plitt
& Christie L. Kriegsfeld, The Punitive Damages Lottery Chase is Over: Is There
a Regulatory Alternative to the Tort of Common Law Bad Faithand Does It Provide an Alternative Deterrent?,
37 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 1221, 1231 (2005) (in punitive damages context, suggesting that "[the] uncertainty
of the actual punishment coupled with the uncertainty of the actual amount help deter the wrongdoer
from further misconduct").
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of distinguishing violators from non-violators, and do not allow those who did
not violate the law to advertise that fact by showing that the government has not
applied the stricter rules to them. Honest corporations do not benefit from lower
costs and lesser government controls.

7. PROPOSAL
Many questions arise in connection with my proposed changes to the Act. As
always, the devil is in the details. When should relief from the Act be granted?
Should it be automatic, unless a triggering event occurs? Or should the Act continue to apply generally unless corporations are exempt from the Act? And if so,
who should grant the relief? What principles should guide the answers to these
questions?
Guiding principles. A few guiding principles can help answer these questions.
First, any change should further the main purpose of the Act-that is, to deter
the violations that the Act was designed to address. There is no reason to believe
that those violations and the potential for the violations have ceased to exist.
However, balanced against this main purpose of the Act is the equally important
purpose of granting honest corporations a competitive advantage over corporate
violators. The purpose of this proposal is to relieve honest corporations of having
answers to
to change their existing good habits for other good habits. Thus,17 the
2
the questions above should be evaluated in light of this balance.
This suggests that a process of effectuating the proposal should allow for shortterm evaluations of the impact of the Act and relief from its provisions rather than
a one-time final determination. Those evaluations should include weighing the
costs and benefits to the actors, including the corporations, the regulators (including Congress), and the financial system as a whole. Further, the costs of any
of the changes must be considered and examined over time. Moreover, the change
should minimize the effect on the actors' incentives. Those incentives should
remain as much the same as possible. In sum, the guiding principles for the
proposal are
(1) Aim at maximizing the deterrent effect of the Act as well as the competitive advantage of honest corporations and seek a balance between
those two ideals;
(2) Minimize the cost of the Act to innocent parties;
(3) Allow for short-term evaluations of the effects of this proposal; and
(4) Consider the costs to the regulators and to honest corporations of the
proposal.

172. 1 concede that the balance cannot be quantified and requires more research and experience
with the Act.
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How Should Relief from the Act Be Granted? Should relief from the Act be
automatic, unless a triggering event occurs?1 73 The provisions of the Act that
dictate internal compliance mechanisms are very cumbersome. Therefore, those
provisions of the Act should not apply without evidence of dishonesty or abuse
of trust. One question is: What kind of evidence should trigger the applicability
of those provisions? The second question is: Should corporations be presumed
innocent until there is some triggering event that eliminates that presumption or
should corporations bear the burden of showing innocence before the burdens of
the Act's compliance provisions are lifted?
Alternative 1. This alternative is based on the assumption that a corporation
which is not subject to a "triggering event" is an honest corporation to which the
Act should not apply The triggering event should be as unambiguous as possible
such as a guilty verdict. In addition, because applicability of the Act is likely to
be viewed as a punishment, the presumption of innocence should apply with all
its rigor, as it does in criminal law. Corporations that do not experience a triggering
event should benefit from a presumption that they are honest.
I propose that the triggering event should be a guilty verdict: not an investigation by regulators or any process leading to criminal prosecution. The exclusion
from the Act sends a message: "If you were not found to have misbehaved, you
are automatically exempt." If you were found to have misbehaved, then the burdens
and costs of compliance with the Act apply to you within a specific timeframe.
However, automatic application of the Act upon a guilty verdict might produce
incentives which this proposal was not intended or designed to produce. For
example, the accused would have incentives to avoid a verdict and that may lead
to more settlements and to stronger bargaining positions of the prosecutors visa-vis the accused in their negotiations with corporations and their management.
That is not intended nor designed by the proposed approach. The focus here is
on rewarding honest corporations, not on increasing the bargaining powers of
prosecutors.
Another alternative is for the Act to be a tool within the prosecutor's discretion.
The Act could become a new form of punishment and a basis for negotiations
between prosecutors and corporations and management as to the appropriate
punishment for improper conduct. This solution, too, does not meet the purpose
of the proposal's approach for it changes the prosecutors' authority But this is a
different case because prosecutors have discretion with respect to settlements.
More important, settlements often include compliance and corporate restructuring requirements which are tailor-made to the specific circumstances of the accused corporation and its management and depend on the bargain between them
and the prosecutors.
173. The violations that could trigger the stricter rule should follow the present provisions of the
Act. A violation of the Act should trigger the applicability of all its provisions. Therefore, every corporation that has been held to have violated the laws covered by the Act should automatically be
subject to the provisions of the Act. Further, suspended sentences, which today do not include supervision of the convicted corporation, should automatically include that the convicted corporation
is subject to the provisions of the Act.

Using the Sarbanes-Oxley Act to Reward Honest Corporations 191
Therefore, such settlements could include making the Act applicable to corporations at the discretion of prosecutors. In addition, prosecutors should be free
to offer relief from the Act as part of a settlement. Because settlements are so openended, relief from the Act should be left to the bargaining process among the
regulators and the accused. If this proposal is followed, then the results of settlements should be reviewed periodically to determine whether and how the change
has affected the results of settlements.
Similarly, a corporation whose license or registration is revoked should be subject to the Act automatically If, however, the license is suspended, then the authority that suspended the license may, after giving its reasons, relieve the licensee
or registrant of the applicability of the Act, with or without conditions.
Discretion regarding probation is vested in the courts. Presumably, courts could
evaluate whether the Act's requirements are appropriate for the corporation that
is subject to probation. In addition, probation involves a measure of monitoring
and supervision, arguably making the applicability of the Act unnecessary or too
burdensome. On the other hand, the Act contributes to heightened awareness of
top management and to a change in the corporate culture, which is one of the
main purposes of probation. There may be benefits in applying the Act to corporations on probation and standardizing that part of the probation process. I
would apply the Act automatically to any corporation on probation and vest the
court with the authority to relieve the accused corporation of the Act or a part of
the Act.
Alternative 2. The Current Legal Status Quo Is Maintained but the Act Is
Amended to Authorize Specified Regulators to Exempt from the Act Those
Corporations That Are Not Subject to a Triggering Event? The SEC would be
granted this exceptive authority But if the corporations are also regulated by
others, such as banks or insurance companies, or the Commodity Futures Trading
Commission, then those regulators should have exceptive power as well. However, the SEC should have a veto power over all exemptions. The reason for this
latter suggestion is that the focus of bank and insurance regulators, for example,
is somewhat different from the focus of the Act and the SEC. The main concern
of bank and insurance regulators is to maintain the financial viability of their
wards to ensure that those financial institutions meet their obligations to the
public (e.g., the depositors or policyholders). The SEC is charged with protecting
investors and the market system. Its regulation may conflict with the financial wellbeing of banks and insurance companies. Therefore, some form of cooperation
among the regulators should take place. However, the solution outlined above
imposes costs on the taxpayers and might create tension among the regulators.
If concerns with the tension among regulators are significant, then instead of
an automatic exclusion, the Act could be amended to provide an exemption from
the Act for a corporation that can show compliance with the relevant laws for a
number of years, for example, five years. A regulatory agency, such as the banking,
insurance, or securities agency, could then determine whether an exclusion or
exemption is merited. The amended Act can then provide the principles and
timing under which the agencies will be required to provide an appropriate ex-
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emption. Such an exemption may also serve to grant a competitive advantage to
the particular corporation.
The costs of complying with the Act are arguably very high. That is why corporations and their management are seeking relief from the compliance provisions
of the Act. That is why small corporations protest, some corporations "go private"
or relocate abroad, and some foreign corporations avoid the United States. Some
argue that the Act is punitive or that the costs of the Act exceed its benefits. Rather
than evaluate the merits and demerits of the Act, this Essay focuses on distinguishing the honest corporations from the rogue corporations. That could be accomplished by specific exemptions (which impose some burden of proof on all public
corporations) or by applying the Act to those caught in the criminal prosecution
net (which imposes on the government the burden of showing wrongdoing). The
higher the costs of the Act, the greater the reward to honest corporations.
CONCLUSION

The U.S. Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 can help re-establish a culture of honesty
within corporations by continuously reminding management of the need for honest, forthright behavior, as well as legal compliance and honest accounting as part
of its decision-making processes. However, the Act applies to honest corporations
and to institutions that are highly regulated such as banks, insurance companies,
and investment companies. The Act's requirements are costly, and are imposed
on all corporations, whether rogue or honest. The Act does not reward honest
corporations by a competitive advantage, and robs them of their ability to advertise that they have behaved well. In addition to preventing corporations from
competing through fraud, and changing the culture of rogue corporations, corporate criminal law should also provide rewards for maintaining an honest corporate culture. Exemption from some of the more onerous provisions of the Act
offers a singly unique opportunity to reward honest corporations. This opportunity should not be missed.

